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Abstract 
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1.  Introduction 
 
There is a growing literature in industrial organisation using micro-level firm and 
establishment data to test theory regarding the factors associated with employment growth.  
This literature modifies some of the central tenets stemming from early theory, and indicates 
substantial heterogeneity in firms’ behaviour within industries and over the business cycle 
(Sutton, 1997). The literature has concentrated on testing Gibrat’s (1931) Law of 
Proportionate Effect which states that the growth rate of a firm does not depend on its 
current size and past growth history. However, new theories of firm growth have emerged 
dealing with issues such as industry dynamics and the effects of learning over the life-cycle 
of firms (e.g. Jovanovic, 1982, and Pakes and Ericson, 1995).  
In recent years the greater availability of good micro-level data and advanced 
econometric techniques have created new possibilities for the analysis of firm growth. For 
example, GMM methods (e.g. Oliveira and Fortunato, 2006) and simulation techniques (e.g. 
Cabral and Mata, 2003) have been used to capture different features of the size distribution. 
The empirical evidence is benefiting from larger samples of firms or establishments and the 
availability of a wider array of explanatory variables. However, the comparability of different 
studies remains a challenge due to the variety of the methods and definitions used. 
Sample selection arising from increased exit probabilities amongst small 
establishments having slow or negative growth may overstate the growth rate of smaller 
units (Mansfield, 1962).  Although studies tend to find sample selection adjustments make 
little difference (Evans, 1987a, 1987b; Hall, 1987) the absence of selection effects may be 
due, at least in part, to reliance on functional form or weak instruments to identify equations. 
These identification problems are not usually discussed, even though they may affect the 
reliability of results. 
In Britain, there is a small empirical literature on employment growth but it is 
somewhat under-developed due to data inadequacies (e.g., Dunne and Hughes, 1994; Hart 
and Oulton, 1996; Geroski et al., 1997; Geroski et al., 2003; Bryson, 2004). This is 
unfortunate since analysis of establishment-level dynamics, including patterns of 
employment growth and exit, can contribute to a better understanding of how jobs are 
created and destroyed. This, in turn, can inform debate regarding appropriate public policy 
in areas such as labour market regulation and taxation. Furthermore, better knowledge of 
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factors affecting growth at the micro-level is crucial in identifying the potential sources of 
growth in the whole economy.  
In particular, the role of human capital in the growth process has not received much 
attention in the literature. High-skilled labour may be a necessary requirement for the 
creation and implementation of new technologies and innovations. Investing in the 
workforce, for example through training, may increase the firm’s capability to expand its 
operations. New knowledge on these relationships helps in understanding the role of human 
capital structure and investments in the post-entry performance of establishments.  
This study takes advantage of very rich micro-data from a nationally representative 
panel survey of British workplaces and their employees covering the period 1998-2004.  We 
use it to explore the impact of workplace characteristics on establishment-level employment 
growth. The study tests insights from industrial economics relating to influences on 
employment growth. In particular, we examine the influences of establishment size, age, 
technology, and human capital investments. We test the sensitivity of our employment 
growth findings to selection effects arising from differential probabilities of workplace 
survival.  
We conduct separate analyses for single establishment firms and those belonging to a 
larger organisation. We are also able to identify the impact of takeovers (agreed and 
opposed), workplace amalgamations and splits, and management buyouts.  By controlling for 
such changes we are better able to estimate factors associated with internal growth, as 
opposed to changes in growth attributable to firm structural change. 
Findings are broadly supportive of Gibrat’s Law in that there is little correlation 
between initial size or lagged growth on subsequent growth, even when one has accounted 
for the effects of size on survival.  Younger workplaces are less likely to survive than older 
workplaces and, once this is accounted for in the selection modelling, younger workplaces 
have higher growth rates.   There is some evidence that sunk costs increase survival 
probabilities, but no evidence of effects on employment growth.  Workforce composition 
has some influence over both workplace survival and growth, whereas direct measures of 
human capital investments are associated with workplace survival but not workplace growth. 
Findings differ for single independent establishments and those belonging to multi-site 
firms.  Single-site firms have higher survival probabilities and lower internal employment 
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growth than their multi-site firm counterparts.  Furthermore, age is not associated with 
growth or survival in establishments belonging to multi-site firms. 
 The paper is structured as follows. The second section reviews the existing theory 
and empirical literature on growth. The third section introduces the data and econometric 
framework. The empirical analysis and the results are presented in the fourth section. Finally, 
the concluding section discusses the policy implications of the findings. 
 
 
2.  Theory and evidence on factors affecting employment growth 
This section outlines the theoretical literature and empirical evidence on firm growth and the 
effects of size, age, sunk costs and human capital. There are excellent surveys on the recent 
literature (e.g. Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007; Caves, 1998) covering a wider range of studies 
on firm formation, growth and survival. 
 
2.1. Firm size and growth 
According to Gibrat’s (1931) Law of Proportionate Effect the growth rate of a firm is 
independent of its current size and its past growth history.  Growth should be independent 
of initial size and there should be no serial correlation in growth rates. Empirical evidence 
has challenged these suppositions. First, it appears that growth rates of new and small firms 
are negatively related to their initial size, with smaller firms at the outset growing more 
rapidly than larger ones (for the UK see Dunne and Hughes, 1994). However, Gibrat’s Law 
appears to hold for the UK in all but the smallest companies (Hart and Oulton, 1996).  
Second, there is serial correlation in patterns of growth.  Geroski et al. (1997) for Britain find 
positive effects of lagged growth, but patterns differ across studies (Caves, 1998: 1949-1950). 
In the long run, firm size is found to follow a random walk (Geroski et al., 2003).   
Sample selection arising from increased exit probabilities amongst small 
establishments having slow or negative growth may overstate the growth rate of smaller 
units. Hart and Oulton (1996: 1250) readily admit that their results may be biased because 
they relate only to surviving companies.  However, studies that seek to adjust for sample 
selection also seem to support Gibrat’s Law.  A study concentrating on trade union effects 
for Britain in the 1990s found a negative correlation between size and growth (Bryson, 
2004).  But, once account was taken of the large positive impact of size on survival, size had 
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a positive but statistically non-significant impact on growth.  This suggests that the primary 
impact of size is to enhance survival chances: accounting for the selection effect associated 
with lower survival rates among slower growing small establishments renders the size effect 
on growth statistically non-significant. Similarly, Lotti et al. (2007) found that after market 
selection, including a period of ‘shakeout’ in the Italian radio, TV and communication 
equipment industry, the resulting industrial “core” did not depart from a Gibrat-like pattern 
of growth. This leads them to conclude that Gibrat’s law can be seen as a long-run regularity 
after market selection (and learning) have fully played their roles. 
Changes in ownership structure or links to foreign firms may have a profound effect 
on the growth prospects of an individual establishment. In most of the literature, the 
assumption is that Gibrat’s Law relates to internal growth but, as Kumar (1985: 329) notes, 
‘the overall growth of firms consists of internal growth (due to new investment) and 
acquisition growth’. Blonigen and Tomlin (2001) study the size-growth relationship for 
foreign-owned affiliate plants in the United States. Their results strongly reject Gibrat’s Law 
for Japanese manufacturing affiliates.   
 
2.2. Firm age effects 
In Jovanovic’s life-cycle model (1982) firms are uncertain about their own capabilities before 
starting a business, but they learn about their relative efficiency – which is treated as a fixed 
permanent characteristic - over time through natural selection.  This ‘passive learning’ 
process implies a negative relationship between establishment age and growth, and a positive 
relationship between age and survival.  The reason is that as the firm ages it becomes more 
confident about its costs, adjusting its growth accordingly, which results in a decline in the 
mean and variance of the firm’s growth rate.  Jovanovic’s model implies Gibrat’s law holds 
for mature firms. Pakes and Ericson (1995) posit an active learning model wherein firm 
performance is driven by firm-specific active learning and investments in R&D and 
innovation activities.  The model predicts that, over time, any association between the firm’s 
initial size and current size disappears. 
There is empirical confirmation of Jovanovic’s supposition that growth diminishes 
with size at a decreasing rate, and decreases with age holding firm size constant (Evans, 
1997b), though not in the largest firms (Dunne et al., 1989). What little is known for Britain 
comes from a study that did not focus on this relationship: it suggests non-linear effects of 
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age on growth (Bryson, 2004). Although it is often assumed that the negative correlation 
between ageing and growth is associated with ‘geriatric effects’ arising from firms’ reduced 
propensity to invest in new technologies and new techniques, due to data constraints there is 
limited empirical research in this area.  One exception is Salvanes and Tveteras (2004) who 
show that vintage capital effects increase plant closure probabilities in Norwegian 
manufacturing. 
 
2.3. The role of sunk costs 
Cabral (1995) argues that, because capacity and technology choices involve some ‘sunkness’, 
or non-recoverable component, small entrants – because they face higher exit probabilities 
than their larger counterparts – will invest more gradually initially, only raising investment 
subsequently.  This, he argues, induces negative dependence between size and expected 
growth, even controlling for sample selection. Cabral’s model has been extended to include 
investments in human capital that involve some degree of ‘sunkness’ (Nurmi, 2004a). 
Doms, Dunne and Roberts (1995) find “increases in the capital intensity of the input 
mix and increases in the use of advanced manufacturing technologies are negatively 
correlated with plant exits and positively correlated with plant growth”. During the 1980s, 
the adoption of new microelectronic technologies in British workplaces was negatively 
correlated with employment growth but the correlation was positive having controlled for 
workplace characteristics (Blanchflower et al., 1991; Machin and Wadhwani, 1991).  
Blanchflower and Burgess (1995) found similar results using the 1990 Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey (WIRS) cross-section.  Van Reenen (1997) using British firm-level panel 
data confirms these findings having accounted for fixed effects and the endogeneity of 
technology and employment choice.  However, none of the British studies focus on the 
relationship between technological choices and size.  
According to Cabral (1995: 168), R&D intensity can also be seen as a proxy for the 
degree of ‘sunkness’ of investment costs. Walsh (2000) studies the role of sunk costs in 
explaining the growth and failure patterns in Irish manufacturing. Walsh finds that Gibrat’s 
Law holds for small businesses that operate in endogenous sunk cost sectors (advertising 
and R&D) but fails in exogenous sunk cost sectors (homogeneous goods). Yasuda (2005) 
and Calvo (2006) also find positive effects of R&D and innovating activity on employment 
growth in Japan and Spain respectively. 
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2.4. Human capital effects 
It is only recently that analysts have considered the impact of human capital on employment 
growth.  A priori, it is not obvious what impact higher human capital will have on 
employment growth.  It may be that employers simply hire labour that is ‘fit for purpose’, 
the ‘fit’ being dependent upon whether the employer seeks to compete at the price or quality 
margin for his or her chosen product or service.  If this is so, one might expect no 
systematic relationship between the quality of human capital deployed and employment 
growth.  Alternatively, Nurmi (2004a) conceives of two firm types, the first operating in new 
or innovative markets with less certain growth paths who tend to be reliant on high-skilled 
labour to learn about their growth potential, and firms operating in standard markets with 
more certain futures able to rely on less-skilled workers.  The model predicts that firms with 
high-skilled workers grow faster than firms with low-skilled personnel.  Romer (1986, 1990) 
suggests that, regardless of firm type, if investment in human capital improves labour 
productivity – for instance because tasks are performed more efficiently, or labour is more 
innovative, or management is of higher calibre – this may translate into a competitive 
advantage resulting in employment growth. Building on the technological change literature, 
Andersson et al. (2007) propose a “make versus buy” model of workforce skill adjustment, 
where choices between providing training to workers and buying required skills are closely 
related to technology investments and R&D. According to their results, human resource 
management practices have implications for firm performance, measured by labour 
productivity.  
There is conflicting empirical evidence on the impact of human capital on 
employment growth but Nurmi (2004b) and Maliranta (2003) for Finland and Persson 
(2004) for Sweden find positive associations between relative education and growth in 
manufacturing. In considering the effects of training on growth, Bryan (2006) emphasises 
that sales would be a preferable measure for growth because training may be provoked by 
employment growth. Nevertheless, Bryan finds that the relationship between training and 
growth is weak for a relatively small sample of small firms in Wales. 
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2.5. Differences between single- and multi-site organisations  
There are theoretical reasons to believe that the growth patterns of establishments belonging 
to single-establishment firms and those belonging to multi-site firms will differ 
systematically.  Within a multi-plant firm, central management will wish to expand those 
parts of the firm that are profitable and close down unprofitable parts.  Single-establishment 
firms, on the other hand, may put up with poor profitability for longer because, for them, 
plant closure is synonymous with firm closure (Williamson, 1970).  Multi-plant firms have 
lower exit sunk costs due to their ability to dispose of physical assets and human resources, 
though this factor becomes less important as plant size increases. Plants belonging to a larger 
firm may also have easier access to external financing, which may have a positive effect on 
their growth. In fact, growth patterns appear to differ only in small ways between single-
establishment firms and multi-establishment firms (Caves, 1998: 1957). However, there are 
empirical studies (e.g., Dunne et al. 1989 and Persson 2004) finding that firms belonging to a 
multi-site organisation have higher growth rates than single establishments. 
 
 
3. Data and econometric framework 
3.1. Data  
Our data are the 1998-2004 Workplace Employment Relations Panel Survey. The level of 
observation is the workplace, namely a place of employment at a single address or site.  The 
Panel follows up on the 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey which is a stratified 
random sample of workplaces in Britain with at least 10 employees.  The 2004 Panel has two 
components.  The first is a single interview conducted with the senior manager responsible 
for employment relations on a day-to-day basis.  These interviews were conducted at a 
random sub-sample of the workplaces that had participated in the 1998 survey, had 
continued to be in operation throughout the intervening six-year period, and employed at 
least 10 employees at the time of the 2004 interview.  In total 938 interviews were 
conducted, a response rate of 75 percent.  In addition, the remaining establishments from 
the 1998 survey that were not selected for a Panel interview were screened by telephone to 
establish whether they were still in existence and to establish the current level of 
employment at their workplace.  Of the 1,506 private sector workplaces in the 1998 survey, 
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1,262 were still in existence in 2004, 240 had closed down and 4 were unaccounted for.1  
Since we are interested in the effects of market conditions on employment growth our 
analyses are confined to those workplaces in the private trading sector.  This leaves us with a 
sample of 1,060 surviving trading sector workplaces.   However, 2004 employment data were 
only available for 813 of these workplaces.  The remaining 247 are therefore missing from 
the employment growth equations.  We tackle this missing data problem in the estimation as 
discussed below. 
Our first dependent variable is workplace employment growth between 1998 and 
2004.  The data are derived from an identical question asked in both years: “Currently how 
many employees do you have on the payroll at this establishment?” Some analysts have 
followed Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) in using an employment growth measure based on 
the change in employment as a percentage of the average of employment in two periods – in 
our case, 1998 and 2004 thus: 
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However, although this measure is superior to the conventional growth measure 
(change in employment as a percentage of employment in the first period) in that it is more 
normally distributed, it does not give an accurate per annum rate of growth.  We therefore 
use an alternative measure: 
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This gives the log employment growth rate per annum, where 6.3 is the median 
number of years between both interview points.  The graph below shows the distribution of 
the variable.  In analyses we exclude outliers in the top and bottom percentile of the 
distribution. 
 
                                                 
1 Eight cases identified as private sector workplaces in WERS98 were dropped from the analyses because 
subsequent checks by the WERS research team revealed that they were not workplaces. 
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Our second dependent variable is a (0,1) dummy identifying whether the workplace 
survived over the period. Unlike many analyses, our data permit us to distinguish workplace 
closure from relocations, name changes, mergers, splits, takeovers and other forms of 
ownership change. Information on workplace outcomes in 2004 comes from survey 
interviewers’ contacts with workplaces as part of the second wave of the panel.  The 
outcome codes provide the information to identify workplace closure (Chaplin et al, 2005). 
Workplace closure is defined as the complete cessation of the activities of a workplace with 
the termination of all contracts of employment. The transfer of employment to a new site or 
to another workplace in the same organization is not included in this definition, nor is a 
simple change of ownership such as a take-over.   
Descriptions of the co-variates used as independent variables in the analysis and their 
mean values are presented in Appendix Table A1.  All variables used in estimation were 
measured at the time of the 1998 survey or earlier thus preserving a gap in time between 
independent covariate measurement and employment and survival outcomes.  Our 
discussion is confined to those variables that are the focus of the paper. 
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Size: In addition to the continuous workplace size data obtained in 1998 and 2004, 
respondents provided retrospective data on employment levels in the year prior to the 1998 
survey.  We use these data to construct the log change in employment in the year prior to the 
1998 survey, thus permitting us to test for serial correlation in patterns of growth.  We 
incorporate a missing dummy where this retrospective information is absent and set these 
cases to zero on employment change in 1998-1997.  A dummy variable identifies whether 
there had been “any reductions in the number of employees in any section or sections of the 
workforce” in the year prior to the 1998 survey.  Another dummy variable identifies whether 
the workplace is a stand-alone independent establishment or part of a larger organization.  
Firm size, as opposed to workplace size, is captured four dummy variables plus a further 
dummy capturing those workplaces where these data are missing.  Because larger firms are 
invariably multi-site firm size is entered as an alternative to workplace size and the stand-
alone identifier. 
Age: The age of the workplace is the number of years it has been operating at its 
current and any previous address.  Dummy variables identify workplaces aged under 5 years, 
5-9 years and 10 or more years, with a further dummy capturing those workplaces where the 
data are missing.2 
Sunk costs: In addition to the training measures discussed below which might 
themselves be viewed as proxies for sunk costs, we use four measures.  The first is the use of 
email by management to communicate with staff which we consider to be a rather imperfect 
measure of sunk investments in technology.  The second is achieving the Investors in People 
Award which is awarded in recognition of an employer’s achievement of training and 
development good practice.  The third is the attainment of the quality standards BS5750 or 
ISO9000.  Finally, to help capture investments in technological and organizational change we 
use information on the changes managers said had been introduced at the workplace in the 
previous five years. 3  They were shown a card where the following changes were listed: 
1. Changes in payment systems 
2. Introduction of new technology 
3. Changes in working time arrangements 
4. Changes in the organisation of work 
                                                 
2 Some of these missing cases arise due to a routing error in the questionnaire. 
3 This question was only asked of workplaces aged 5 or more years. 
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5. Changes in work techniques or procedures 
6. Introduction of initiatives to involve employees 
7. Introduction of new product or service. 
 
Human capital:  We use a variety of information to proxy workplace human capital.  
The first is the occupational and gender shares in workplace employment collected on a 
workforce data sheet.  The data identify the largest non-managerial occupational group at the 
workplace, the percentage of employees who are managers and professionals, the percentage 
of employees who are female, and the age composition of the workforce.  Another aspect of 
human capital is captured in mangers’ responses to the question: “About how long does it 
normally take before new [employee in the largest occupational group] are able to do their 
job as well as more experienced employees already working here?”  A third aspect of human 
capital is the proportion of experienced employees in the largest occupation undertaking off-
the-job training in the last 12 months and the duration of that training.  Our measures simply 
identify whether the workplace is above or below the median on these two training 
dimensions for workplaces with the same largest occupation. 
Structural change: We can identify the impact of takeovers (agreed and opposed), 
workplace amalgamations and splits, and management buyouts.  By controlling for such 
changes we are also better able to estimate factors associated with internal growth.  
Managers were asked whether there had been any change in the controlling ownership of the 
workplace in the previous five years and, if so whether this had entailed  
1.  An agreed takeover / merger 
2. A takeover / merger formally opposed 
3. Sold by parent organisation 
4. Ex-public sector, now privatised / denationalised 
5. Management buyout 
6. Buy-out by employees generally. 
We use this information to establish the degree to which growth is associated with 
ownership change rather than internal growth. 
 
In addition to standard controls for region and industry, our baseline models include 
a range of data items capturing the nature of the product market or service that the 
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workplace provides, and the state of market competition for their goods and services.  We 
also control for the financial performance of the workplace in 1998 relative to the industry 
average as perceived by the workplace manager, thus helping to account for workplaces that 
might have already been in trouble at the beginning of the panel.  We include the type of 
measure the workplace uses to assess its performance (profit, value added, sales etc.), thus 
soaking up some workplace heterogeneity that might otherwise be unaccounted for. 
Workplace employment growth and survival probabilities are partly determined by 
the industry in which they are located.  We are interested in industry dynamics in its own 
right and because they account for some of the variance in workplace fortunes which might 
not otherwise be accounted for.  We match in time-varying industry-level data at 2-digit SIC 
level from two sources.  The first is the EUKLEMS database (version March 2007) which  is 
part of a research project, financed by the European Commission, to analyse productivity in 
the European Union at the industry level.  The data are available for 71 2-digit industries for 
each year over the period 1970-2004 (Timmer et al., 2007).  We matched these data to the 
WERS workplace data using industry codes for the 53 industries common to the two 
datasets.4  The data item that appears in this paper is changes in capital compensation, 
defined as the difference between gross value added and labour costs.  We derive five 
variables measuring changes in capital compensation for the periods 1996-1990, 1989-1984, 
1983-1977 and 1976-1970. The variables are constructed as differences in the log levels.  So, 
for example, change in capital compensation for the period 1996-1990 is computed as: 
log(cap95+cap96)-log(cap90+cap91) to smooth short run changes. The second industry-
level data set we use is OECD’s STructual ANalaysis (STAN) Database which includes 
industry-level information that allows us to calculate labour productivity (value 
added/employment), export and import ratios to gross output, and capital intensity for the 
period since 1992 for 58 2-digit industries.  OECD’s ANalytical Business Enterprise 
Research and Development Database (ANBERD) also allows us to calculate R&D intensity, 
defined as R&D expenditures on industrial R&D activities carried out in the business 
enterprise sector.   
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3.2. Econometric framework 
Correlates of the employment growth measure described above are estimated using  
regression models that account for the complex survey design allowing results to be 
generalised to the workplace population from which the sample was drawn.  Models are run 
on data weighted by the inverse of the workplace’s sampling probability.  As well as allowing 
the results to be generalised to the population from which the sample is drawn, the use of 
probability weights also guards against estimation bias which can arise through differential 
sample selection probabilities.5  We employ the Huber-White robust variance estimator that 
produces consistent standard errors in the presence of heteroscedasticity.  
All control variables relate to 1998, with the exception of employment change and 
some performance measures which cover 1997-98 and the lagged industry-level variables 
derived from EUKLEMS and STAN. The equation can be written as follows: 
 
iiii GXG εβ ++= 9798989804 '  
 
where 9804iG denotes employment growth per annum at workplace i in the period 
1998-2004. 98' iX  is a vector of observable attributes affecting employment adjustment at the 
workplace, measured in 1998 (including some performance measures covering the period 
1997-98) with β a vector of coefficients to be estimated. 9798iG  is a lagged dependent 
variable for employment growth over the period 1997-98. Finally,ε is the error term.  The 
rationale for the variables chosen has been outlined above. 
Any negative relationship between firm size and growth may simply be a function of 
sample selection bias arising because small establishments with lower employment growth 
rates are more likely to disappear from the sample than larger establishments with similar 
growth rates.  Similarly, young workplaces with lower growth rates may have a higher 
probability of closure than larger workplaces with similar growth rates. To overcome any 
downward bias in the estimated relationship between size (age) and growth this may induce 
we adopt the approach undertaken in recent research whereby results from the employment 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 WERS does not cover industries like Forestries, Fishing, Mining and Minerals Extraction. 
5 Differential sampling fractions can result in standard estimator biases (Skinner, 1997).  The weights account 
for all variation in sampling probabilities, thus eliminating differential sampling probability as a possible source 
of estimation bias. 
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equation are adjusted by selection equation estimating probability of survival using a probit 
model.  We estimate the survival equation and growth equation jointly by maximum 
likelihood weighted by the sampling probability.  This estimation can be understood as if the 
survival equation generates a selection term based on the likelihood of each 1998 workplace 
surviving through to 2004.  This selection term is then carried forward into the employment 
change equation over the period 1998-2004.  These final results relating to employment 
change are ‘selection adjusted’ since the procedure eliminates any bias in the estimates 
caused by tendencies for unmeasured characteristics which influence workplace survival to 
be correlated with unmeasured characteristics which influence employment growth 
(Heckman, 1979).   
We run models which rely on functional form to identify the equations, and we have 
estimated as robustness checks variants that use lagged change in industry-level capital 
compensation as instruments.  We argue that these capital compensation variables capture 
dynamic change in industry-level capital formation which implies shifts in the barriers to 
firm entry into the industry.  In turn, this affects the propensity of employers to keep 
workplaces open since firms take account of the opportunity costs of keeping old plants 
open relative to opening new plants: periods of growth (reduction) in capital compensation 
imply higher (lower) entry barriers and thus an increased (reduced) likelihood that firms will 
prolong the life of existing plants rather than set up new plants. There is no logical reason 
for the inclusion of industry-level lagged changes in capital formation when seeking to 
explain employment growth conditional on survival. The four variables capturing lagged 
industry-level capital compensation are jointly statistically significant for survival if entered 
alone or alongside other controls. It is not possible to test the validity of these exclusion 
restrictions.  However, two points are worth noting.  First, the measures of lagged capital 
compensation were jointly non-significant in the employment equations.  Second, the 
selection models identified on functional form performed in a similar way to the models 
with the instruments included, suggesting that their inclusion made little difference to the 
selection modelling.  We therefore present the models identified on functional form.   
There is statistical support for the selection adjustment in the models identified on 
functional form.  The RHO indicating the correlation in the error terms in the two equations 
is highly significant (and the Wald test of independence in the two equations is also highly 
significant), as is the LAMBDA summarising the estimated magnitude of the unmeasured 
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influences on growth.6  There is also an economic interpretation to the selection model.  The 
rho capturing correlations between unobservables in the survival and growth equations is 
negative and highly statistically significant. Thus, for example, if older workplaces are more 
likely to survive but are less inclined to grow (RHO < 0) than younger workplaces then 
estimating the impact of workplace age on the selected (‘low-growth’) sample leads to a 
downward (upward) bias in the growth rates of younger (older) workplaces.  This point also 
applies to larger versus smaller workplaces. 
Our models are predictive in the sense that they use information collected in 1998 or 
earlier to predict workplace employment growth subsequently. It is therefore reasonable to 
make causal inferences about the variance in growth rates using these 1998 predictors.  Of 
course, those 1998 measures may themselves be a function of the trajectory in workplace 
performance at the time of the initial survey.  If so these baseline characteristics are not 
independent of growth trajectories.  We cannot wholly account for this potential 
endogeneity.  However, we maintain that our efforts to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, coupled with our use of performance indicators in 1998, help tackle this issue. 
There is a further problem that arises with our data which we mentioned earlier, 
namely the absence of employment data in 2004 for 248 of our surviving workplaces.  There 
are a number of ways one might tackle this potentially non-random missing data problem.  
We have chosen to fit tobit models, treating these cases as left-censored observations, to see 
how their inclusion in our estimation affects results.  The assumption is that, in the absence 
of these cases, we only observe a portion of the underlying distribution in employment 
growth.  The tobit model fits the remainder of this distribution, thus accounting for the 
missing employment data.  We also seek to account for these missing observations in the 
Heckman selection model by treating these cases as non-survivors.  
                                                 
6 See footnotes 3 and 4 to Appendix Table A2 
. 
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Analysis of  growth 
 
4.1: Size of workplace 
Neither the size of the workplace in 1998 (number of employees and its squared term), nor 
the firm structure (captured with the single-establishment dummy) are correlated with 
workplace employment growth over the period 1998-2004 (Table 1).  Nor are lagged 
employment growth and reductions in sections of the workforce in the period 1997/98.  The 
addition of controls makes little difference.  The picture is a little different when one 
accounts for missing employment data among surviving workplaces using tobit estimation.  
In these models employment growth in the period 1998/97 is positively correlated with 
subsequent employment growth indicating serial correlation which runs counter to Gibrat’s 
Law.  The Heckman selection models point to the importance of accounting for size effects 
on survival.  Although establishment size per se has little direct impact on survival, single-
establishment firms have higher survival probabilities than establishments belonging to 
multi-site firms.  Nevertheless, having adjusted for observable and unobservable factors 
associated with workplace survival, workplace size remains statistically non-significant.  
Lagged growth is also statistically non-significant.  Reductions in workforce size in the 
period 1998/97 emerge as significantly positively correlated with subsequent employment 
growth suggesting that, once one accounts for the correlation between such reductions and 
the potential for workplace closure, workforce reorganizations often precede periods of 
growth.7 
We investigated the size effects further by replacing the continuous linear and 
squared terms for number of employees in 1998 with dummy variables in the Heckman 
selection models.  This revealed a clear non-linearity in survival probabilities: relative to 
workplaces with 10-24 employees, those with 25-49 employees had significantly lower 
survival probabilities (-.51, t=2.44) whereas those with 50-99 employees had significantly 
higher survival probabilities (.75, t=2.48).  However, having corrected for survival 
                                                 
7 Including lagged capital compensation as exclusion restrictions to the survival equations strengthens this 
result relating to reductions in sections of the workforce: with these exclusion restrictions this variable is 
significantly negatively correlated with survival but significantly positively correlated with growth.  Other results 
relating to size are unaffected. 
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probabilities these employment size dummies remained statistically non-significant in the 
growth equation.8 
 
Table 1: Size of Workplace and Employment Growth 
 OLS tobit OLS tobit Heckman (1) Heckman (2) 
Controls? No No Yes Yes Yes, Emp 
growth 
Yes, 
survival 
Yes, Emp 
growth 
Yes, 
survival 
Single-establishment 
firm 
-0.003 0.122 -0.009 0.072 -0.020 0.419 -0.024 0.400 
 (0.18) (1.86) (0.68) (1.21) (1.40) (2.16)* (1.59) (2.41)* 
Log N employees in 
1998 
0.004 0.184 -0.005 0.176 0.011 -0.288 0.007 -0.020 
 (0.10) (1.09) (0.19) (1.40) (0.38) (0.51) (0.24) (0.05) 
Log N employees in 
1998 squared 
-0.002 -0.021 -0.000 -0.023 -0.002 0.056 -0.001 0.010 
 (0.37) (1.10) (0.08) (1.60) (0.67) (0.90) (0.42) (0.24) 
log difference in 
employment between 
1998 and 1997 
-0.020 0.160 0.000 0.224 0.006 -0.384 -0.009 0.119 
 (1.40) (1.97)* (0.01) (2.97)** (0.41) (1.63) (0.62) (0.56) 
Log difference in 
employment missing 
-0.020 0.052 0.016 0.126 0.040 -0.630 0.030 -0.001 
 (0.68) (0.32) (0.48) (0.96) (1.11) (1.42) (0.86) (0.00) 
Reductions in 
workforce in 
section(s) of 
workforce in 1997 
-0.007 -0.044 0.018 -0.033 0.025 -0.273 0.024 -0.221 
 (0.40) (0.59) (1.51) (0.61) (2.01)* (1.45) (1.89) (1.53) 
R-squared 
/pseudo R-squared 
0.01  0.35   0.32  0.21 
Prob>F  0.03  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes:  
(1) Full models are appended in Appendix Table A2. 
(2) T-statistics are in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at a 95% confidence level.  ** denotes 
significance at a 99% confidence level. 
(3) With and without controls OLS N=797, tobit N=1061 (248 censored). 
(4) Heckman (1) N=989, 193 censored, 796 uncensored.  Rho -.75 se=.16; sigma=.09 se=.01 lambda=-.069 
se=.02. Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =     7.15   Prob > chi2 = 0.0075 
(5) Heckman (2) N=1237, 441 censored, 796 uncensored.  Rho -.83 se=.08; sigma .10 se=.01 lambda -.083 
se=.014. Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =    19.92   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000.  Note that Heckman (2) 
differs from Heckman (1) in that it treats surviving workplaces with missing employment data as non-survivors 
(ie. SURVIVE=0) whereas, in Heckman (1) these cases are absent from the analysis. 
 
These results are broadly supportive of Gibrat’s Law in that there is little correlation 
between initial workplace size or lagged growth on subsequent growth, even when one has 
accounted for the effects of size on survival.  In checking the robustness of these results we 
considered three further issues: first, whether any link between size and growth was 
obscured by changes in ownership structure, secondly whether the relationship differed 
systematically across single-establishment and multiple-establishment firms, and thirdly 
                                                 
8 These analyses are not presented but they are available on request. 
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whether size effects differed if one replaces workplace size and the single-establishment 
dummy variable with dummy variables for firm size. 
Our baseline models contain a single ownership change variable, namely whether the 
workplace had been sold by its parent company in the five years prior to 1998.  Being sold 
was strongly negatively correlated with employment growth, an effect which grew in 
magnitude a little having accounted for its positive correlation with workplace survival (see 
Appendix Table A2).  In an alternative model specification we introduced five other dummy 
variables capturing ownership change relating to privatisation, a takeover or 
merger/acquisition, management buyout, a change in shareholders or partners, and a catch-
all ‘other’ ownership change.  Only the ‘other’ ownership change category was significant: it 
was correlated with higher growth.  Their inclusion did not affect the impact of being sold.  
Nor did their inclusion affect the results relating to size.  Next we decided to remove all 
workplaces that had been subject to one of these ownership changes to get a ‘clean’ estimate 
of workplaces’ internal growth.  This sample selection resulted in the removal of one-fifth of 
the sample (256 workplaces).  With this exclusion single establishment firms had significantly 
lower employment growth than those belonging to multiple establishment firms (-0.024, 
t=1.85).  This effect strengthened having accounted for survival probabilities (-.035, t=2.52).  
Thus it appears that being a single establishment firm was associated with lower internal 
employment growth.9 
Separate regressions were run for the 228 single independent establishments and the 
569 establishments belonging to a multi-site firm.  The smaller samples meant that we had to 
reduce the number of covariates we controlled for in the models.  The shape of size effects 
differed for single independent establishments and those belonging to larger organizations: 
among single- establishment firms size in 1998 had an inverted-u relationship with growth 
whereas, among those belonging to larger organizations the relationship was u-shaped. 
However, in both cases the relationships were not statistically significant.  The other 
difference to emerge related to the effects of reductions in sections of the workforce in 
1998/97: their positive effect on subsequent growth noted above was confined to singles 
and was only apparent having accounted for the fact that it was also correlated with lower 
survival probabilities. 
                                                 
9 This growth could have been affected by ownership change subsequent to 1998, something we do not 
consider here. 
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Finally, we reran the models presented in Table 1 but replaced the log of workplace 
size, its squared term, and the single-establishment dummy with dummy variables for firm 
size. Workplaces located in large firms were less likely to survive than those in small firms 
but, conditional on survival, they had faster growth rates.10   
 
4.2: Age of workplace 
The age of establishment in 1998 was not correlated with employment growth over the 
period 1998-2004, either in isolation or once controls are added, and whether one accounts 
for the missing employment data among surviving workplaces or not (Table 2).  However, 
younger workplaces were less likely to survive than older workplaces and, once this is 
accounted for in the selection modelling, workplaces aged under 5 years had higher growth 
rates than workplaces aged 10 or more years.  This is consistent with Jovanovich’s life-cycle 
model of passive learning. 
 
Table 2: Age of Workplace and Employment Growth 
 OLS tobit OLS tobit Heckman (1) Heckman (2) 
Controls? No No Yes Yes Yes, 
Emp 
growth 
Yes, 
survival 
Yes, 
Emp 
growth 
Yes, 
survival 
Age of 
establishment 
(ref: 10+ years) 
        
< 5 years 0.032 -0.165 0.034 -0.039 0.044 -0.440 0.050 -0.342 
 (1.28) (1.18) (1.80) (0.37) (2.25)* (1.70) (2.41)* (1.48) 
5-9 years 0.022 -0.062 -0.010 -0.046 0.001 -0.386 0.004 -0.317 
 (1.18) (0.68) (0.64) (0.67) (0.05) (1.86) (0.23) (1.89) 
Don’t’ know age 0.003 0.107 0.003 0.185 0.001 0.013 -0.009 0.209 
 (0.12) (1.42) (0.14) (1.82) (0.06) (0.04) (0.41) (0.69) 
R-squared 
/pseudo R-
squared 
0.01  0.35   0.32  0.21 
Prob>F  0.2159  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes:  
(1) See notes (1)-(5) in Table 1. 
 
The inclusion of a broader array of ownership change measures does not alter the results 
presented in Table 2 very much, although it does strengthen the negative relationship 
between being a young workplace and surviving.  However, the exclusion of workplaces that 
had experienced some type of ownership change in the 5 years prior to 1998 results in a 
much stronger association between very young workplaces and faster employment growth.  
                                                 
10 Relative to the reference category of under 100 employees, workplaces in firms with between 1,000 and 
10,000 employees grew by 4.3 percent per annum more quickly (t=2.20) and those with 10,000 or mor3e 
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If workplace age is entered alone those workplaces aged under 5 years had an ‘internal’ 
growth rate of 6 percent per annum more than those workplaces aged 10 years or more 
(0.062, t=2.35).  This effect is robust to the inclusion of controls and to adjustment for 
sample selection (0.055, t=2.43 and 0.059, t=2.59 respectively).    
The relationship between workplace age and employment growth differed across 
single-site firms and those belonging to larger organizations.  Among single-site firms 
younger workplaces grew faster than older ones: workplaces aged under 5 years grew 7 
percent per annum more quickly than workplaces aged 10 years or more while those aged 5-
9 years grew 5 percent per annum more quickly.  The effect was more pronounced having 
accounted for selection due to workplace survival because the youngest workplaces had 
lower survival probabilities.11  Age was not associated with either growth or survival in 
establishments belonging to larger firms.  These results make sense because, in the case of 
single-site firms, the age of the workplace is synonymous with the age of the firm so this is 
where one might expect theories regarding firm age and growth to be most apparent.  This is 
not the case, of course, among workplaces belonging to larger firms. 
 
4.3: Sunk Costs 
The literature discussed in Section 2.3 suggests that sunk costs should be positively 
associated with workplace survival because they raise the costs of new firm entry and, in the 
case of existing firms, raise the costs of creating new plants relative to maintaining existing 
ones.  The predictions regarding employment growth are more ambiguous, and may imply 
lower growth initially but potentially faster growth in the longer run. 
The three dummy variables proxying sunk costs – Investors in People, attaining 
quality standards and the use of email – are not significantly associated with employment 
growth (although Investors in People is negatively associated with growth in the tobit model 
which seeks to account for surviving workplaces with missing employment data).  However, 
contrary to expectations, Investors in People status is negatively correlated with workplace 
survival (see Appendix Table A2). 
                                                                                                                                                 
employees grew 4.8 percent per annum more quickly (t=2.33). 
11 Among single independent workplaces, compared to workplaces aged 10 or more years, those aged under 5 
years had a significantly lower probability of survival (-1.44, t=3.33).  Having accounted for selection on 
survival these younger workplaces grew at a rate of 13 percent per annum faster than those aged 10 or more 
years (0.128, t=2.26). Full results are available on request. 
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Changes to technology and work organization might also be viewed as sunk 
investments employers make in capital and labour.  The seven dummy variables capturing 
these changes in the five years prior to 1998 were added to the baseline model.12  With the 
exception of changes in payment systems which were weakly associated with higher growth 
none of these changes were associated with employment growth.13   Changes in working 
time arrangements and changes in work techniques/procedures were associated with lower 
survival probabilities.  The number of changes made was not associated with growth, 
although there was some evidence that making any changes as opposed to none was 
associated with lower survival probabilities. 
Together these findings offer little support for the proposition that sunk costs 
increase survival probabilities or affect employment growth.  However, this is not quite the 
end of the story.  First, changes in technology and work organization are associated with 
survival in single-establishment firms.  The introduction of new technology is positively 
associated with survival, as predicted under Cabral’s model, as are changes in work 
techniques/procedures.  Changes in pay systems and working time, on the other hand, were 
associated with lower survival probabilities.  Changes were not significant for the survival of 
workplaces belonging to larger organizations.  Second, in the absence of workplace-level 
information on R&D investments, we use industry-level STAN data for the period 1992-
1996.14  We introduced the log of growth in industry-level R&D expenditure over the period 
1995/6-1992/3 and levels of industry R&D in 1992.  R&D growth was positively associated 
with workplace survival but neither R&D growth nor R&D levels were associated with 
workplace employment growth.  There is therefore some limited evidence to suggest that 
sunk costs increase survival probabilities, but no evidence of effects on employment growth. 
 
 4.4: Human Capital 
The relationship between human capital and employment growth is presented in Table 3.  
Employment growth rose and then fell in an inverted-U shape with the percentage of 
                                                 
12 Because the question was only asked of workplaces aged 5 or more years younger workplaces drop out of the 
analysis. 
13 0.019 (t=1.79) in the OLS, and 0.019 (t=1.73) in the Heckman selection model. 
14 Our measure of R&D intensity is (r&d/industry employment) where r&d is expenditures on industrial R&D 
activities carried out in the business enterprise sector, regardless of the origin of funding, in GBP millions.  
Unfortunately these data are not available for a number of industries so our analyses with these data are run on 
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Managers/Professionals at the workplace, a finding which became stronger having 
accounted for sample selection.15  Having accounted for the percentage of workers in the top 
two occupations, the nature of the largest occupational group at the workplace was not 
strongly correlated with growth.  When entered alongside other human capital proxies, but 
without other controls, these dummies were only jointly statistically significant in the tobit 
model which sought to account for missing employment data.  Having accounted for sample 
selection in the Heckman models growth was strongest where the largest non-managerial 
occupational group was Professionals. 
Previous research using the same data set found a positive relationship between 
training and workplace survival (Collier, Green and Kim, 2007), confirming earlier research 
for Britain (Collier, Green and Peirson, 2005).  In our estimates survival probabilities rose 
with the incidence of training for the workplace’s largest occupational group16, but the 
duration of that training was not significant.  Furthermore, training had no effect on 
employment growth.  
Having a small percentage of employees who were women was strongly and 
significantly correlated with lower workplace survival rates but higher employment growth 
rates.  These effects are robust to sample selection. 
The time that a worker takes to become competent in her job, which we treat as a 
measure of human capital investment, was not significant for employment growth.  
However, lower investments of this sort were negatively associated with workplace survival. 
These findings were confirmed in analyses of ‘internal growth’ which removed 
workplaces subject to ownership change in the five years prior to 1998. Taken together, 
these findings suggest that workforce composition had some influence over both workplace 
survival and growth, whereas direct measures of human capital investments were associated 
with workplace survival but not workplace growth. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
smaller samples.  N=552 for the survival models and N=359 for the growth models.  Collinearity problems 
meant dropping single digit industry and the measures of financial performance used in 1998. 
15 Separate analyses for single independent establishments and those belonging to multiple-establishment 
organizations indicated that this inverted-U shape was confined to multis. 
16 Further analyses suggested that this association was confined to workplaces belonging to multiple-
establishment organizations. 
 23
Table 3: Human Capital and Employment Growth 
 OLS Tobit Heckman (1) Heckman (2) 
Controls? Yes Yes Yes, 
emp 
growth 
Yes, 
survival 
Yes, 
emp 
growth 
Yes, survival 
Largest occupational group (ref.: operative and assembly workers) 
Professionals 0.057 0.117 0.056 0.143 0.063 -0.233 
 (1.60) (0.70) (1.51) (0.24) (1.60) (0.50) 
Technical/scientific -0.000 -0.055 0.012 -0.398 0.026 -0.513 
 (0.00) (0.53) (0.37) (1.14) (0.82) (1.77) 
Clerical/secetarial -0.015 0.201 -0.005 -0.220 -0.013 0.070 
 (0.64) (2.36)* (0.21) (0.68) (0.54) (0.26) 
Craft/skilled manual -0.023 0.026 -0.015 -0.269 -0.011 -0.249 
 (1.41) (0.34) (0.82) (1.11) (0.55) (1.12) 
Personal service 0.011 0.394 0.001 0.323 -0.030 0.774 
 (0.44) (3.31)** (0.02) (0.69) (0.99) (2.17)* 
Sales -0.011 0.020 0.002 -0.614 0.004 -0.371 
 (0.55) (0.21) (0.09) (1.83) (0.16) (1.50) 
Routine unskilled manual -0.005 -0.041 0.006 -0.355 0.009 -0.288 
 (0.24) (0.42) (0.28) (1.18) (0.43) (1.16) 
Don’t know LOG -0.057 0.035 -0.077 0.850 -0.073 0.473 
 (1.17) (0.19) (1.53) (1.30) (1.43) (0.91) 
% managers and professionals 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.011 0.002 -0.009 
 (1.69) (0.33) (1.83) (0.85) (2.18)* (0.82) 
% managers and professionals 
squared 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (1.91) (0.38) (1.77) (0.63) (1.98)* (0.74) 
<=10% of employees are women 0.040 0.022 0.064 -0.813 0.070 -0.630 
 (3.04)** (0.26) (4.10)** (3.25)** (4.10)** (2.75)** 
Time taken for LOG to do job as well 
as experienced employees (ref: > 
month) 
      
1 week or less -0.005 0.000 -0.001 -0.019 -0.005 0.282 
 (0.20) (0.00) (0.05) (0.07) (0.19) (1.18) 
> 1 week <=  month -0.002 -0.009 0.006 -0.409 0.009 -0.234 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.45) (2.36)* (0.61) (1.49) 
Don’t know -0.013 -0.292 -0.007 -0.544 0.018 -0.723 
 (0.40) (1.43) (0.21) (1.01) (0.45) (1.48) 
whether % LOG receiving off job 
training in last 12 months is below, at 
or above median for workplaces with 
same LOG (1=below 2=median 
3=above) 
0.003 -0.060 -0.002 0.234 0.003 0.055 
 (0.62) (1.77) (0.27) (2.25)* (0.50) (0.67) 
whether duration of training for LOG 
off job training in last 12 months is 
below, at or above median for 
workplaces with same LOG (1=below 
2=median 3=above) 
-0.006 0.034 -0.006 0.037 -0.007 0.106 
 (1.01) (1.13) (0.86) (0.37) (0.93) (1.31) 
Constant -0.108 -0.586 -0.118 1.491 -0.108 0.820 
 (1.47) (2.12)* (1.55) (1.08) (1.36) (0.84) 
Observations 813 1061 989 989 1237 1237 
R-squared 0.35      
Notes:  
(1) See notes (1)-(5) in Table 1. 
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4. Conclusions 
This paper examines factors associated with employment growth in the British private traded 
sector using workplace panel data for the period 1998-2004.  It focuses on the effects of 
workplace size, age, workplace size, age, technology, R&D and human capital investment 
and explores the sensitivity of results to survival probabilities.  We point to important 
differences in factors associated with growth in single-site and multi-site firms.  We also 
show that factors associated with employment growth per se differ from those that influence 
internal growth, that is, organic growth from within the workplace as opposed to growth 
associated with ownership change. 
The findings are broadly supportive of Gibrat’s Law in that there is little correlation 
between growth and initial workplace size or lagged growth, even when one has accounted 
for the effects of size on survival.  However, single independent establishments had lower 
internal employment growth than establishments belonging to multi-site firms, a finding 
which runs counter to Gibrat’s Law. Also, single-establishment firms had higher survival 
probabilities than establishments belonging to multi-site firms, something we might expect 
since the former marks the end of the firm whereas the latter does not.  
Previous research has not considered the role played by reductions in sections of the 
workforce which can occur among growing and shrinking workplaces.  Reductions in 
sections of the workforce in the period 1998/97 were positively correlated with subsequent 
employment growth suggesting that, having accounted for the correlation between 
workforce reductions and the potential for workplace closure, workforce reorganizations 
often precede periods of growth.  This is consistent with creative job destruction on the part 
of single-establishment firms.  
We also considered the effects of firm size, as opposed to establishment size.  
Workplaces located in large firms were less likely to survive than those in small firms but, 
conditional on survival, they had faster growth rates.  This suggests large firms reallocate 
labour within and across their establishments, perhaps closing poorer performing workplaces 
and increasing employment in their surviving workplaces.  This is consistent with Disney et 
al.’s (2003) work which found that UK multi-establishment manufacturers closed down their 
poorly-performing plants. 
Younger workplaces were less likely to survive than older workplaces and, once this 
was accounted for in the selection modelling, younger workplaces had higher growth rates 
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than older workplaces, ceteris paribus.   However, the relationship between workplace age and 
employment growth differed across single-site firms and those belonging to larger 
organizations.  Age was not associated with either growth or survival in establishments 
belonging to larger firms.  These results make sense because, in the case of single-site firms, 
the age of the workplace is synonymous with the age of the firm so this is where one might 
expect theories regarding firm age and growth to be most apparent.  This is not the case, of 
course, among workplaces belonging to larger firms.  
In addition to the traditional focus on the age and size of employers we considered 
the role of sunk costs and human capital on employment growth.  There is some evidence 
that sunk costs increase survival probabilities, but no evidence of effects on employment 
growth.  Workforce composition had some influence over both workplace survival and 
growth, whereas direct measures of human capital investments are associated with workplace 
survival but not workplace growth. Thus, even if investment in direct investments in human 
capital can enhance competitiveness as Romer (1986, 1990) suggests it may lead to jobless 
growth rather than increased employment. 
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Appendix Table A1: Unweighted Means, SDs, Min and Max for variables used in the analysis. 
 
Panel A: All trading sector  
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       dage1 |      1257    .0843278    .2779893          0          1 
       dage2 |      1257    .1376293    .3446476          0          1 
       dage3 |      1257    .7494033    .4335291          0          1 
      dagedk |      1257    .0286396    .1668578          0          1 
     dsingle |      1257    .2505967    .4335291          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      lemp98 |      1257    4.674659    1.243782   2.302585   10.27405 
    lemp98sq |      1257     23.3982    12.17957   5.301898   105.5561 
    ldif9897 |      1257    .0330513    .2249189  -1.390595   2.397895 
      ldifdk |      1257    .0453461    .2081448          0          1 
     dreduct |      1257     .389817    .4879027          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    dorgsiz1 |      1257    .2020684    .4017028          0          1 
    dorgsiz2 |      1257    .2283214    .4199179          0          1 
    dorgsiz3 |      1257    .2545744    .4357951          0          1 
    dorgsiz4 |      1257    .2720764    .4452061          0          1 
    dorgsims |      1257    .0429594    .2028464          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       dlog1 |      1257    .0684169    .2525604          0          1 
       dlog2 |      1257    .0652347    .2470378          0          1 
       dlog3 |      1257    .1272872    .3334271          0          1 
       dlog4 |      1257    .1495625     .356784          0          1 
       dlog5 |      1257    .0652347    .2470378          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       dlog6 |      1257    .1758154    .3808146          0          1 
       dlog7 |      1257    .2084328    .4063495          0          1 
       dlog8 |      1257    .1272872    .3334271          0          1 
      dlogdk |      1257    .0127287    .1121459          0          1 
    pcmanpro |      1257    15.87246    17.75861          0        100 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    pcmanpsq |      1257    567.0523    1315.147          0      10000 
     dwpfem1 |      1257    .1400159    .3471416          0          1 
     dstuck1 |      1257    .0620525    .2413469          0          1 
     dstuck2 |      1257    .2315036    .4219613          0          1 
    dstuckdk |      1257    .0151154    .1220604          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     trnrank |      1257    2.122514    .8847311          1          3 
   trtimrank |      1257    1.920446    .8380124          1          3 
      demail |      1257    .0318218    .1755953          0          1 
      daward |      1257     .300716    .4587519          0          1 
    dwrkplac |      1257    .3818616    .4860363          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      drecog |      1257    .3866348    .4871726          0          1 
      dfinp1 |      1257    .1614956    .3681339          0          1 
      dfinp2 |      1257    .3786794    .4852511          0          1 
      dfinp3 |      1257    .2959427     .456647          0          1 
      dfinp4 |      1257    .0668258    .2498194          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      dfinp5 |      1257    .0970565    .2961525          0          1 
      dmeas1 |      1257    .5727924    .4948698          0          1 
      dmeas2 |      1257    .1797932    .3841679          0          1 
      dmeas3 |      1257    .0875099    .2826934          0          1 
      dmeas4 |      1257     .035004     .183863          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      dmeas5 |      1257    .1249006    .3307377          0          1 
       dsold |      1257    .0421639    .2010429          0          1 
       dsic1 |      1257    .2163882    .4119458          0          1 
       dsic2 |      1257    .0381862    .1917217          0          1 
       dsic3 |      1257    .0469372    .2115884          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       dsic4 |      1257    .2211615    .4151942          0          1 
       dsic5 |      1257    .0883055    .2838516          0          1 
       dsic6 |      1257    .0652347    .2470378          0          1 
       dsic7 |      1257    .0723946    .2592433          0          1 
       dsic8 |      1257    .1320605    .3386912          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
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       dsic9 |      1257           0           0          0          0 
      dsic10 |      1257     .026253    .1599504          0          1 
      dsic11 |      1257    .0548926    .2278612          0          1 
      dsic12 |      1257    .0381862    .1917217          0          1 
       dreg1 |      1257    .0453461    .2081448          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       dreg2 |      1257    .0787589    .2694694          0          1 
       dreg3 |      1257    .1376293    .3446476          0          1 
       dreg4 |      1257    .0564837    .2309453          0          1 
       dreg5 |      1257    .1081941     .310749          0          1 
       dreg6 |      1257    .0883055    .2838516          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       dreg7 |      1257    .2036595    .4028789          0          1 
       dreg8 |      1257    .0859189    .2803557          0          1 
       dreg9 |      1257    .0429594    .2028464          0          1 
      dreg10 |      1257    .0851233    .2791762          0          1 
      dreg11 |      1257    .0668258    .2498194          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   dsingprod |      1257    .3953858     .489128          0          1 
    dmarket1 |      1257    .3524264     .477916          0          1 
     dmshar1 |      1257    .2983294    .4577069          0          1 
     dmshar5 |      1257    .1352426    .3421187          0          1 
    dmshardk |      1257    .1233095     .328923          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    dstamar1 |      1257    .4797136    .4997871          0          1 
    dcompet1 |      1257    .0493238    .2166294          0          1 
    dcompet2 |      1257     .318218      .46597          0          1 
   dcompetdk |      1257    .0095465    .0972776          0          1 
     ddegvhi |      1257    .5425617    .4983835          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      ddeghi |      1257    .3237868     .468106          0          1 
    dovrsea1 |      1257    .2243437    .4173154          0          1 
     lempgpa |       813   -.0239669    .1384562  -.8354627   .6694293 
     survive |      1253    .8459697     .361122          0          1 
     empmiss |      1257    .1972951    .3981154          0          1 
 
   
 
Panel B: Trading Sector with Valid LEMPGPA (excluding outliers) 
Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       dage1 |       797    .0664994    .2493094          0          1 
       dage2 |       797    .1417817    .3490451          0          1 
       dage3 |       797     .761606    .4263688          0          1 
      dagedk |       797    .0301129    .1710053          0          1 
     dsingle |       797    .2860728    .4522076          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      lemp98 |       797    4.683347    1.218735   2.302585   9.556692 
    lemp98sq |       797    23.41719    11.90269   5.301898   91.33037 
    ldif9897 |       797    .0401804    .2126652  -.8161366   2.397895 
      ldifdk |       797    .0464241    .2105339          0          1 
     dreduct |       797    .3688833    .4828052          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    dorgsiz1 |       797    .2245922    .4175755          0          1 
    dorgsiz2 |       797     .281054     .449796          0          1 
    dorgsiz3 |       797    .2371393    .4255955          0          1 
    dorgsiz4 |       797    .2183187    .4133643          0          1 
    dorgsims |       797    .0388959    .1934682          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       dlog1 |       797    .0790464    .2699806          0          1 
       dlog2 |       797    .0589711    .2357186          0          1 
       dlog3 |       797    .1292346    .3356701          0          1 
       dlog4 |       797    .1493099    .3566175          0          1 
       dlog5 |       797     .076537    .2660224          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       dlog6 |       797    .1417817    .3490451          0          1 
       dlog7 |       797    .2271016    .4192219          0          1 
       dlog8 |       797    .1242158    .3300347          0          1 
      dlogdk |       797    .0138018    .1167406          0          1 
    pcmanpro |       797     16.5705    18.01038          0   91.45299 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    pcmanpsq |       797    598.5481     1324.11          0   8363.649 
     dwpfem1 |       797    .1518193     .359071          0          1 
     dstuck1 |       797    .0589711    .2357186          0          1 
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     dstuck2 |       797     .238394    .4263688          0          1 
    dstuckdk |       797    .0125471    .1113786          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     trnrank |       797    2.145546    .8833444          1          3 
   trtimrank |       797     1.93601    .8295247          1          3 
      demail |       797    .0238394    .1526444          0          1 
      daward |       797    .2797992    .4491824          0          1 
    dwrkplac |       797    .3989962    .4899995          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      drecog |       797     .378921     .485423          0          1 
      dfinp1 |       797    .1631117    .3696995          0          1 
      dfinp2 |       797    .3977415    .4897388          0          1 
      dfinp3 |       797    .2885822    .4533877          0          1 
      dfinp4 |       797    .0627353    .2426384          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      dfinp5 |       797    .0878294    .2832243          0          1 
      dmeas1 |       797    .5972396    .4907613          0          1 
      dmeas2 |       797     .174404    .3796948          0          1 
      dmeas3 |       797    .0803011    .2719295          0          1 
      dmeas4 |       797    .0313676    .1744187          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      dmeas5 |       797    .1166876    .3212492          0          1 
       dsold |       797    .0401506    .1964355          0          1 
       dsic1 |       797    .2346299    .4240334          0          1 
       dsic2 |       797    .0200753    .1403459          0          1 
       dsic3 |       797    .0501882    .2184702          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       dsic4 |       797    .1894605      .39212          0          1 
       dsic5 |       797    .0928482    .2904018          0          1 
       dsic6 |       797    .0690088    .2536282          0          1 
       dsic7 |       797    .0690088    .2536282          0          1 
       dsic8 |       797    .1380176     .345135          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       dsic9 |       797           0           0          0          0 
      dsic10 |       797    .0326223    .1777576          0          1 
      dsic11 |       797    .0564617    .2309561          0          1 
      dsic12 |       797    .0476788    .2132195          0          1 
       dreg1 |       797    .0476788    .2132195          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       dreg2 |       797    .0815558    .2738587          0          1 
       dreg3 |       797    .1355082    .3424805          0          1 
       dreg4 |       797    .0589711    .2357186          0          1 
       dreg5 |       797    .1179423    .3227423          0          1 
       dreg6 |       797    .0865747    .2813873          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       dreg7 |       797    .1856964    .3891056          0          1 
       dreg8 |       797    .0853199    .2795326          0          1 
       dreg9 |       797      .04266    .2022162          0          1 
      dreg10 |       797    .0890841    .2850439          0          1 
      dreg11 |       797    .0677541    .2514812          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   dsingprod |       797    .3889586      .48782          0          1 
    dmarket1 |       797    .3249686    .4686572          0          1 
     dmshar1 |       797    .3036386    .4601172          0          1 
     dmshar5 |       797    .1430364    .3503298          0          1 
    dmshardk |       797    .1304893    .3370525          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    dstamar1 |       797    .5018821    .5003104          0          1 
    dcompet1 |       797    .0451694    .2078059          0          1 
    dcompet2 |       797    .3375157    .4731593          0          1 
   dcompetdk |       797    .0125471    .1113786          0          1 
     ddegvhi |       797    .5219573    .4998313          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      ddeghi |       797    .3387704    .4735889          0          1 
    dovrsea1 |       797    .2321205    .4224506          0          1 
     lempgpa |       797   -.0226411    .1148578  -.5289214    .353809 
     survive |       797    .9987453    .0354218          0          1 
     empmiss |       797           0           0          0          0 
 
Notes: See notes in Table A2. 
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Appendix Table A2: Employment growth in the Private Trading Sector 
 (1) reg (2) tobit (3) reg (4) tobit (5) reg (6) tobit (7) reg (8) tobit Heckman (1) Heckman (2) 
 lempgpa lempgpa2 lempgpa lempgpa2 lempgpa lempgpa2 lempgpa lempgpa2 lempgpa survive lempgpa survive2 
dage1 0.032 -0.165   0.033 -0.129 0.034 -0.039 0.044 -0.440 0.050 -0.342 
 (1.28) (1.18)   (1.33) (0.94) (1.80) (0.37) (2.25)* (1.70) (2.41)* (1.48) 
dage2 0.022 -0.062   0.020 -0.047 -0.010 -0.046 0.001 -0.386 0.004 -0.317 
 (1.18) (0.68)   (1.08) (0.54) (0.64) (0.67) (0.05) (1.86) (0.23) (1.89) 
dagedk 0.003 0.107   -0.001 0.170 0.003 0.185 0.001 0.013 -0.009 0.209 
 (0.12) (1.42)   (0.05) (1.85) (0.14) (1.82) (0.06) (0.04) (0.41) (0.69) 
dsingle   -0.003 0.122 0.001 0.117 -0.009 0.072 -0.020 0.419 -0.024 0.400 
   (0.18) (1.86) (0.05) (1.74) (0.68) (1.21) (1.40) (2.16)* (1.59) (2.41)* 
lemp98   0.004 0.184 -0.002 0.202 -0.005 0.176 0.011 -0.288 0.007 -0.020 
   (0.10) (1.09) (0.04) (1.18) (0.19) (1.40) (0.38) (0.51) (0.24) (0.05) 
lemp98sq   -0.002 -0.021 -0.001 -0.023 -0.000 -0.023 -0.002 0.056 -0.001 0.010 
   (0.37) (1.10) (0.20) (1.21) (0.08) (1.60) (0.67) (0.90) (0.42) (0.24) 
ldif9897   -0.020 0.160 -0.022 0.165 0.000 0.224 0.006 -0.384 -0.009 0.119 
   (1.40) (1.97)* (1.64) (1.93) (0.01) (2.97)** (0.41) (1.63) (0.62) (0.56) 
ldifdk   -0.020 0.052 -0.017 0.063 0.016 0.126 0.040 -0.630 0.030 -0.001 
   (0.68) (0.32) (0.57) (0.43) (0.48) (0.96) (1.11) (1.42) (0.86) (0.00) 
dreduct   -0.007 -0.044 -0.006 -0.038 0.018 -0.033 0.025 -0.273 0.024 -0.221 
   (0.40) (0.59) (0.33) (0.53) (1.51) (0.61) (2.01)* (1.45) (1.89) (1.53) 
dlog1       0.057 0.117 0.056 0.143 0.063 -0.233 
       (1.60) (0.70) (1.51) (0.24) (1.60) (0.50) 
dlog2       -0.000 -0.055 0.012 -0.398 0.026 -0.513 
       (0.00) (0.53) (0.37) (1.14) (0.82) (1.77) 
dlog3       -0.015 0.201 -0.005 -0.220 -0.013 0.070 
       (0.64) (2.36)* (0.21) (0.68) (0.54) (0.26) 
dlog4       -0.023 0.026 -0.015 -0.269 -0.011 -0.249 
       (1.41) (0.34) (0.82) (1.11) (0.55) (1.12) 
dlog5       0.011 0.394 0.001 0.323 -0.030 0.774 
       (0.44) (3.31)** (0.02) (0.69) (0.99) (2.17)* 
dlog6       -0.011 0.020 0.002 -0.614 0.004 -0.371 
       (0.55) (0.21) (0.09) (1.83) (0.16) (1.50) 
dlog8       -0.005 -0.041 0.006 -0.355 0.009 -0.288 
       (0.24) (0.42) (0.28) (1.18) (0.43) (1.16) 
dlogdk       -0.057 0.035 -0.077 0.850 -0.073 0.473 
       (1.17) (0.19) (1.53) (1.30) (1.43) (0.91) 
pcmanpro       0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.011 0.002 -0.009 
       (1.69) (0.33) (1.83) (0.85) (2.18)* (0.82) 
pcmanpsq       -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
       (1.91) (0.38) (1.77) (0.63) (1.98)* (0.74) 
dwpfem1       0.040 0.022 0.064 -0.813 0.070 -0.630 
       (3.04)** (0.26) (4.10)** (3.25)** (4.10)** (2.75)** 
dstuck1       -0.005 0.000 -0.001 -0.019 -0.005 0.282 
       (0.20) (0.00) (0.05) (0.07) (0.19) (1.18) 
dstuck2       -0.002 -0.009 0.006 -0.409 0.009 -0.234 
       (0.14) (0.15) (0.45) (2.36)* (0.61) (1.49) 
dstuckdk       -0.013 -0.292 -0.007 -0.544 0.018 -0.723 
       (0.40) (1.43) (0.21) (1.01) (0.45) (1.48) 
trnrank       0.003 -0.060 -0.002 0.234 0.003 0.055 
       (0.62) (1.77) (0.27) (2.25)* (0.50) (0.67) 
trtimrank       -0.006 0.034 -0.006 0.037 -0.007 0.106 
       (1.01) (1.13) (0.86) (0.37) (0.93) (1.31) 
demail       -0.067 -0.159 -0.050 -0.195 -0.036 -0.024 
       (1.24) (1.26) (0.91) (0.33) (0.64) (0.05) 
daward       -0.016 -0.193 -0.011 -0.381 0.005 -0.493 
       (1.50) (2.83)** (0.88) (2.03)* (0.33) (3.03)** 
dwrkplac       0.018 0.097 0.017 0.036 0.012 0.169 
       (1.41) (1.65) (1.29) (0.18) (0.85) (1.02) 
drecog       0.005 0.096 0.009 -0.157 0.003 -0.011 
       (0.42) (1.61) (0.73) (0.80) (0.19) (0.07) 
dfinp2       0.023 0.053 0.015 0.154 0.013 0.048 
       (1.37) (0.92) (0.84) (0.60) (0.75) (0.25) 
dfinp3       -0.021 -0.057 -0.019 -0.288 -0.016 -0.226 
       (1.14) (0.80) (1.00) (1.18) (0.83) (1.13) 
dfinp4       0.004 0.053 -0.009 0.547 -0.017 0.586 
       (0.11) (0.53) (0.27) (1.56) (0.53) (2.11)* 
dfinp5       -0.042 0.046 -0.031 -0.610 -0.024 -0.306 
       (1.19) (0.31) (0.86) (1.40) (0.65) (0.81) 
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dmeas2       -0.007 -0.053 -0.012 0.303 -0.008 0.019 
       (0.51) (0.77) (0.84) (1.39) (0.55) (0.11) 
dmeas3       -0.023 0.125 -0.023 0.086 -0.029 0.246 
       (1.17) (1.72) (1.12) (0.28) (1.28) (0.96) 
dmeas4       -0.039 0.059 -0.049 0.697 -0.051 0.468 
       (0.99) (0.52) (1.27) (1.06) (1.28) (1.16) 
dmeas5       0.047 0.000 0.033 0.398 0.031 0.203 
       (1.55) (0.00) (1.05) (1.11) (0.96) (0.69) 
dsold       -0.099 0.120 -0.104 0.445 -0.123 0.878 
       (3.03)** (1.47) (3.12)** (1.06) (3.68)** (2.58)* 
dsic2       0.051 -0.040 0.057 -0.042 0.070 -0.144 
       (1.00) (0.19) (1.03) (0.07) (1.19) (0.29) 
dsic3       0.031 -0.148 0.025 -0.030 0.032 -0.211 
       (1.36) (1.15) (0.99) (0.08) (1.17) (0.64) 
dsic4       0.076 0.050 0.059 0.649 0.060 0.366 
       (3.47)** (0.55) (2.62)** (2.02)* (2.61)** (1.47) 
dsic5       0.029 -0.265 0.021 0.795 0.051 -0.288 
       (1.32) (2.31)* (0.86) (1.69) (1.93) (0.92) 
dsic6       0.037 0.117 0.031 0.378 0.031 0.431 
       (1.63) (1.45) (1.28) (1.14) (1.15) (1.29) 
dsic7       0.046 0.071 0.038 0.585 0.030 0.553 
       (1.49) (0.66) (1.25) (1.42) (0.97) (1.75) 
dsic8       0.009 -0.011 -0.003 0.641 -0.009 0.523 
       (0.43) (0.13) (0.13) (1.97)* (0.37) (1.93) 
dsic10       0.040 0.102 0.045 -0.299 0.026 0.199 
       (1.15) (0.67) (1.22) (0.51) (0.69) (0.42) 
dsic11       0.074 -0.252 0.087 -0.527 0.108 -0.737 
       (2.73)** (1.91) (2.97)** (1.23) (3.36)** (2.07)* 
dsic12       0.115 0.159 0.096 1.045 0.090 0.755 
       (4.34)** (1.57) (3.47)** (1.84) (3.20)** (2.01)* 
dreg1       -0.026 -0.061 -0.054 1.224 -0.046 0.362 
       (1.33) (0.52) (2.40)* (2.95)** (2.02)* (1.08) 
dreg2       -0.001 -0.238 -0.014 0.338 0.003 -0.179 
       (0.03) (2.04)* (0.62) (1.15) (0.16) (0.71) 
dreg3       0.013 -0.075 0.011 -0.220 0.022 -0.415 
       (0.73) (0.77) (0.60) (0.84) (1.13) (1.71) 
dreg4       -0.007 -0.109 -0.024 0.241 -0.015 -0.234 
       (0.37) (0.74) (1.25) (0.66) (0.72) (0.77) 
dreg5       -0.031 -0.077 -0.039 0.280 -0.037 0.073 
       (1.61) (0.94) (1.88) (1.00) (1.73) (0.29) 
dreg6       0.029 -0.040 0.023 -0.054 0.020 -0.060 
       (1.53) (0.40) (1.12) (0.19) (0.98) (0.26) 
dreg8       0.036 -0.001 0.031 0.183 0.029 0.023 
       (1.42) (0.01) (1.25) (0.62) (1.16) (0.09) 
dreg9       0.032 0.051 0.008 1.226 0.009 0.356 
       (1.74) (0.29) (0.38) (2.92)** (0.37) (0.85) 
dreg10       0.025 0.080 0.014 0.242 0.011 0.037 
       (1.29) (0.89) (0.76) (0.91) (0.53) (0.14) 
dreg11       0.045 0.116 0.027 0.548 0.020 0.392 
       (1.82) (1.26) (1.00) (1.56) (0.73) (1.29) 
dsingprod       0.005 -0.069 0.015 -0.268 0.021 -0.270 
       (0.44) (1.17) (1.14) (1.39) (1.54) (1.69) 
dmarket1       -0.024 -0.079 -0.026 0.226 -0.018 -0.072 
       (1.81) (1.48) (1.86) (1.10) (1.22) (0.44) 
dmshar1       0.047 0.047 0.058 -0.716 0.055 -0.464 
       (3.21)** (0.76) (3.69)** (3.51)** (3.48)** (2.73)** 
dmshar5       -0.030 0.101 -0.023 -0.311 -0.037 0.178 
       (1.67) (1.40) (1.20) (1.09) (1.86) (0.71) 
dmshardk       0.038 0.044 0.041 -0.484 0.033 -0.263 
       (2.58)* (0.43) (2.73)** (1.91) (2.07)* (1.20) 
dstamar1       0.019 0.137 0.014 0.186 0.008 0.254 
       (1.91) (2.67)** (1.30) (1.14) (0.66) (1.86) 
dcompet1       0.052 -0.106 0.056 -0.416 0.050 -0.136 
       (1.85) (0.66) (2.02)* (1.13) (1.81) (0.37) 
dcompet2       0.004 0.049 0.007 -0.214 0.002 -0.046 
       (0.36) (0.84) (0.55) (1.07) (0.13) (0.28) 
dcompetdk       -0.013 -0.040 -0.002 0.537 -0.008 0.280 
       (0.26) (0.14) (0.03) (0.68) (0.12) (0.41) 
ddegvhi       0.044 -0.038 0.050 -0.194 0.053 -0.241 
       (2.40)* (0.44) (2.49)* (0.70) (2.40)* (0.96) 
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ddeghi       0.028 -0.040 0.030 -0.048 0.035 -0.216 
       (1.62) (0.47) (1.62) (0.19) (1.76) (0.91) 
dovrsea1       -0.005 -0.026 0.003 -0.553 0.008 -0.469 
       (0.36) (0.50) (0.18) (2.75)** (0.50) (2.63)** 
Constant -0.022 -0.226 -0.004 -0.663 -0.003 -0.679 -0.108 -0.586 -0.118 1.491 -0.108 0.820 
 (2.31)* (5.88)** (0.05) (1.81) (0.04) (1.83) (1.47) (2.12)* (1.55) (1.08) (1.36) (0.84) 
Observations 797 1061 797 1061 797 1061 797 1061 989 989 1237 1237 
R-squared 0.01  0.01  0.02  0.35      
Notes: 
(1) Dependent variables are: LEMPGPA: log employment growth per annum.  LEMPGPA2: log employment growth per annum treating 
survivors with missing employment data as left-censored.  SURVIVE: (0,1) whether survived until 2004.  SURVIVE2: (0,1) whether 
survived until 2004 treating survivors without employment data as zeros. 
(2) The top and bottom percentiles of the employment growth distribution are treated as outliers and removed from estimation. 
(3) For Tobits N=1061 includes 248 censored. 
(3) Heckman (1) N=989, 193 censored, 796 uncensored.  Wald chi2(70)=224.45. Log pseudolikelihood=24.8103. Prob > chi2=0.0000. 
Rho -.75 se=.16; sigma=.09 se=.01 lambda=-.069 se=.02. Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =     7.15   Prob > chi2 = 0.0075 
(4) Heckman (2) N=1237, 193 censored, 441 uncensored.  Wald chi2(70)=188.17. Log pseudolikelihood= 10.91737. Prob > chi2= 0.0000. 
Rho -.83 se=.08; sigma .10 se=.01 lambda -.083 se=.014. Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =    19.92   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
(5) Controls are as follows: 
DAGE: age of establishment including time at previous addresses (DAGE1=<5 yrs; DAGE2=5-9 yrs; reference is DAGE3=10+ yrs; 
AGEDK=dk age).  Note that by collapsing ages of 10+ years I overcome routing problem associated with this variable in original data.   
DSINGLE: single independent establishment 
LEMP98 is log employment size at 1998.   
LEMP98SQ: square of LEMP98 
LDIF9897: log difference in employment between 1998 and 1997 calculated as: ldif9897=log(emp1998)-log(emp1997). 
LDIFDK: LDIF9897 missing 
DREDUCT: there have been reductions in one or more sections of the workforce in the 12 months prior to the 1998 survey interview 
DSIZ*: 1998 employment size dummies as an alternative to LEMP98.  (DSIZ2=25-49; DSIZ3=50-99; DSIZ4=100-199; DSIZ5=200-499; 
DSIZ6=500+; reference is DSIZ1=10-24) 
DLOG1-DLOG8: largest non-managerial occupational group (ref=DLOG7 ie. operative and assembly workers). DLOGDK=don’t know 
largest occupational group 
PCMANPRO: % employees who are managers or professionals; PCMANPROSQ: square of % who are managers/profs. DPCDK: don’t 
know % employees who are managers/professionals. 
DWPFEM1: <=10% of employees are women.    
DSTUCK1: takes 1 week or less for new core employee to do job as well as experienced core employee DSTUCK2: >1 to 1 month.  Ref: 
> 1 month.  DSTUCKDK: data missing 
TRNRANK: whether proportion of core experienced employees receiving off-the-job training in the last 12 months is below, at or above 
the median for workplaces with the same core occupation.  Where 1=below median 2=median 3=above median.  Treated as continuous 
variable here. 
TRTIMRANK: whether time core experienced employees spend on off-the-job training in the last 12 months is below, at or above the 
median for workplaces with the same core occupation. Where 1=below median 2=median 3=above median.  Treated as continuous 
variable here. 
DEMAIL: email used by management to communicate with employees (proxy for IT investment). 
DAWARD: workplace is accredited as an investor in people (proxy for sunk costs in quality assurance). 
DWRKPLAC: whether workplace has attained either of the quality standards BS5750 or ISO9000? (Treated as sunk investment) 
DRECOG: if recognised union.  
DFINP*: Dummies for financial performance of workplace relative to industry average in 1998.  Subjective measure.  DFINP2=better 
than average; DFINP3=average; DFINP4=below/a lot below average; DFINP5=data missing or comparison not possible.  Reference is 
DFINP1=a lot better than average. 
DMEAS*: Measure of financial performance used by workplace (ref: DMEAS1 profits or value added). DMEAS2: sales/fees/budgets. 
DMEAS3: costs or expenditure. DMEAS4: stock market indicators (eg. share price). DMEAS5: other/don’t know.   
DSOLD: sold by parent company in last 5 years.  
DSIC*: single digit industry dummies.  Ref: DSIC1=Manufacturing. 
DREG*: region dummies. Ref: DREG7=rest of the South East 
DSINGPROD: output is concentrated on one product/service 
DMARKET1: market for product/service is local 
DMSHAR*: company’s UK market share for main product/service.  DMSHAR1=<5%; DMSHAR5: >50%.  DMSHARDK: data missing. 
Ref.: market share between 5-50% 
DSTAMAR1: the market is growing.  Reference is all other categories, namely mature, declining, turbulent 
DCOMPET*: number of competitors.  DCOMPET1: none. DCOMPET2: few (ie. 5 or less).  DCOMPETDK: data missing.  Reference: 
many competitors (6+) 
DDEG* subjective perception of degree of market competition.  DDEGVHI: very high.  DDEGHI: high.  Reference: very low, low, 
neither high nor low. 
DOVRSEA*: perception of competition from overseas suppliers.  DOVRSEA1: a lot. Ref: little or none. 
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